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56 L. B. LABORATORIES, INC. v. MITCHELL [39 C.2d 
[L. A. No. 22214. In Bank. May 23, 1952.] 
L. B. LABORATORIES, INC. (a Corporation), Respondent, 
v. WALTER A. MITCHELL, Appellant. 
[la, lb] Actions-Contract or Tort.-A complaint alleging that a 
certified public accountant was employed to prepare and file 
specific tax returns which were due at a specified date and 
that he "negligently'' failed to file them in time may be con-
strued to indicate an action in contract as well as in tort; 
the description of the failure as negligent does not prevent 
the complaint from conveying to the accountant the idea 
that he failed to do what he had promised. 
[2] Limitation of Actions-Pleading-Amendments.-In taxpay-
er's action against a certified public accountant for failure 
to perform his written obligation to file the taxpayer's tax re-
turns in the time required by law, it is proper to deny the 
accountant's motion for leave to amend his answer to plead 
the four-year statute of limitations applicable to actions on 
written contracts {Code Civ. Proc., § 337, subd. 1), where 
such motion was not made until the accountant's motion for 
nonsuit on the ground that the action is barred by the two-
year statute applicable to tort actions (Code Civ. Proc., § 339, 
subd. 1) was opposed on the ground that the action is based 
on breach of a written contract, and where he did not chal-
lenge the opening statement of taxpayer's counsel, made four 
days before, that the action is one on contract, nor challenge 
similar statements made during the presentation of the tax-
payer's case. 
[3] Accountants-Duties.-Where a certified public accountant 
contracts to do a specific thing, namely, to prepare and file 
a taxpayer's income tax returns in the time required by law, 
the obligation is not limited to the exercise of ordinary care, 
but is a positive specific duty, and differs from that of a 
physician who does not agree to achieve any particular re-
sult but merely agrees to act in a nonnegligent manner. 
[4] Limitation of Actions-Pleading-Failure to Plead as Waiver. 
-Where the four-year statute of limitations for actions on 
written contracts (Code Civ. Proc., § 337, subd. 1) is not 
timely raised in an action against a certified public account-
[1] See Ca.l.Jur.2d, Actions, §§ 29, 30; Am.Jur., Actions, § 55. 
[3] See Ca.l.Jur.2d, Accountants, § 2 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Actions, § 15; [2] Limitation of 
Actions, § 148; [3] Accountants; [ 4] Limitation of Actions, § 136; 
[5] Limitation of Actions, § 109. 
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ant to perform his obligation to file a taxpayer's income tax 
returns in the time required by law, and the action is based 
on a written contract rather than on negligence, there is no 
bar of the action by reason of the statute of limitations. 
[5] !d.-Suspension of Statute.-In taxpayer's action against a 
certified public accountan~ for failure to perform his writ-
ten obligation to file the taxpayer's tax returns in the time 
required by law, a finding that if the taxpayer's causes of 
action were barred by Code Civ. Proc., § 339, or any other 
statute of limitations the statute was tolled by the account-
ant's concealment and representations that he had done all 
the things required is supported by evidence that, during the 
period in question, the accountant twice had the taxpayer 
sign an application for an extension of time to file returns 
when the accountant said he could not make out the report 
in time, in each instance stating that the taxpayer had nothing 
to worry about, and that in connection with so-called "com-
pleted returns," which were nullities and which the account-
ant had the taxpayer sign shortly before the last extension 
expired, he stated "that he would take care of the whole 
thing," a statement on which the taxpayer relied. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Carl A. Stutsman, Judge. Affirmed. 
Action against certified public accountant for damages 
suffered from late filing of income tax returns. Judgment 
for plaintiff affirmed. 
Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Balthls, Gordon F. Hampton 
and E. Talbot Callister for Appellant. 
Walter G. Danielson, H. Spencer St. Clair, Alva C. Baird 
and William A. Cruikshank, Jr., for Respondent. 
Howard W. Campen, County Counsel (Santa Clara), Don-
ald K. Currlin, Assistant County Counsel, and Wade H. 
Hover, Deputy County Counsel, as Amici Curiae on behalf 
of Respondent. 
CARTER, J.-Plaintiff was awarded judgment for $17,-
428.43 for damages in an action the nature of which will 
appear later. Defendant appeals. 
According to the :findings of the cour~, plaintiff is a cor-
poration. Defendant is a certified public accountant pur-
suing- his vocation in Los Angeles. Prior to December, 1942, 
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defendant represented to plaintiff that he was an expert in 
all tax matters, both federal and state, and fully capable 
of handling all plaintiff's tax and accountancy problems, 
and in reliance thereon plaintiff employed defendant prior 
to June, 1942, to handle all of such problems. Pursuant to 
the employ:Inent defendant prepared and filed in proper time 
plaintiff's tax returns for the calendar years 1940-1942. Still 
in reliance on defendant's representations, on February 7, 
1944, plaintiff employed defendant to make an income tax 
review of its records for 1943 and to prepare and file on 
or before March 15, 1944, its federal income and excess profits 
tax returns for 1943 and the state franchise tax returns for 
the same year. Defendant accepted the employment on 
February 7, 1944, and reduced his acceptance to writing in 
the form of a letter to plaintiff, stating : ·''This will confirm 
your request that this office conduct an income tax review 
of the corporate books and records and as a result prepare 
the following tax returns for the calendar year 1943; Cali-
fornia Franchise Tax Return, Federal Income Tax Return, 
Federal Excess Profits Tax Return. These services will be 
billed on the basis of $40.00 per diem (eight hours) for all 
time devoted thereto (travel time included). Progress-bill-
ing invoices will be rendered as of the close of each Satur-
day's business." It was intended by the parties at the time 
the contract was made that defendant was to prepare and 
file all of said returns on or before their due date, March 
15, 1944. Defendant breached the contract in (1) that J;te 
did not make a review of plaintiff's records until the early 
part of 1946; and (2) did not file any of the returns until 
March 23, 1946. The breach was due to defendant's negli-
gence and carelessness. AB a result of defendant's breach 
and negligence plaintiff had to pay penalties on the taxes 
due, as the filing of the returns was late. 
In further reliance on defendant's representations, plain-
tiff entered into a written contract on January 27, 1945, for 
similar services for the tax returns for 1944. The breach 
of the contract by defendant was the same and the same 
type of damages followed. 
In January, 1947, the United States Treasury Department 
notified defendant that certain deductions on the federal 
taxes were disallowed and that a 25 per cent penalty for 
late filing should be assessed. Defendant notified plaintiff 
of the former but not the latter, which he concealed from 
plaintiff. Defendant without plaintiff's knowledge protested 
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the federal officers' action. Proceedings were had and de-
fendant's protests denied on July 18, 1947, and a further 
hearing was requested, all of which was concealed from plain-
tiff until March 15, 1948, when defendant told plaintiff that 
the further hearing would be had and it then learned the 
facts. Plaintiff thereafter arrived at a settlement with the 
federal officials in which plaintiff paid 50 per cent of the 
penalties, all to plaintiff's damage in the amount paid. 
Finally, it was found that none of plaintiff's causes of 
action were barred by section 339 of the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure or any other statute of limitation but if they were 
the statute was tolled by defendant's concealment and repre-
sentations that he had done all the things required. 
Judgment was accordingly entered for the damages suf-
fered. 
Defendant contends that plaintiff's action, as stated in its 
complaint, was one in tort-malpractice of an accountant-
and not in contract, and later during the trial it shifted 
its position to a contract theory to defendant's grave preju-
dice in that he did not make contract action defenses and 
was not prepared to meet a contract action; that judgment 
should be ordered entered for him because there was no 
evidence (expert testimony) of negligence and the action 
based on tort liability was barred by the statute of limita-
tion, Code of Civil Procedure, section 339 ( 1). 
The complaint charges in the first count the representa-
tion by defendant of his ability to handle plaintiff's tax prob-
lems; it ''specially employed'' defendant to prepare and file its 
1943 tax returns ; defendant negligently failed to file them in 
time ; as a proximate result of the negligence and failure 
plaintiff was damaged in a named sum. The second count 
contains the same allegations with regard to the state fran-
chise tax returns, the third and fourth as to the taxes for 
1944. In his answer defendant alleges that plaintiff em-
ployed him but that it was understood that the returns could 
not be prepared and filed because of the lack of time. He 
pleaded section 339 (1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, which 
provides a two year limitation for commencing an ·action 
upon contract, obligation or liability not founded upon a 
written instrument which may well indicate that he was as-
suming that the "special employment" was an oral not a 
written contract as well as that the action was one for negli-
gence, in tort, a liability not founded on a writing where 
the injury is to other than person or property. He also al-
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leged that the fault for the late filing was plaintiff's, not his. 
Defendant did not demur to the complaint to have it clari-
fied as to whether reliance was had upon negligence or con-
tract or if the latter, whether it was written or oral. 
[la] Contrary to defendant's contention, the complaint, 
for the purpose of determining whether defendant was mis-
led, may be construed to indicate an action in contract as 
well as in tort. The essential factors of the former are 
present. A special employment was alleged which points 
to a contract, as an employment relation is a contractual 
one. It is alleged that defendant was employed to prepare 
and file specific tax returns which were due at a specified 
date and that he "negligently" failed to file them in time, 
which would be a breach of the contract of employment. The 
description of the failure as negligent does not prevent the 
complaint from conveying to defendant the idea that he failed 
to do what he had promised. These allegations were sufficient 
to apprize him of what he had to meet, and whether or not 
he had made an employment contract with plaintiff and if 
so the terms thereof, were within his knowledge. He made 
no effort by demurrer to have the complaint clarified. 
The indication of a contract action was carried into the 
trial. On the taking of the deposition before trial by de-
fendant of plaintiff's president, Olson, its counsel said, ·in 
the course of discussion, we are proceeding under an action 
against defendant for alleged negligence in performing his 
professional services, but at the beginning of the trial de-
fendant's counsel first made an opening statement in which 
he said contracts were made between plaintiff and defendant 
to prepare the returns. He also said that the complaint was 
for negligence and that section 339 (1) (above mentioned) 
barred the action. In reply, plaintiff's counsel referred ex-
pressly to the written contracts (referred to in the findings) 
and said : ''I might just as well dispose of the position of 
this defendant in this action that this comes under Section 
339 of the Code of Civil Procedure, for the reason that it 
does not, and if counsel believes so, then he has entirely 
misconceived the whole theory of this action; and if he had 
demurred to the complaint on the ground that the complaint 
doesn't allege whether the contract of the employment is 
in writing or is oral he would then have been advised, be-
cause the contract is in writing, and our position is that this 
action therefore is not barred by Section 339 of the Code 
of Civil Procedure but comes under the provisions of Sec-
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tion 337, which is an action upon a contract obligation or 
liability founded upon an instrument in writing, and with 
respect thereto, the four-year period of limitation becomes 
applicable. . .. I believe it could be said that his breach of 
his written employment contract occurred on June 15, 1944." 
Defendant made no protest to those statements, nor did he 
at any time request a continuance to prepare to meet a con-
tract action ; he did not ask leave to amend his answer to 
meet a contract action until later, as will hereafter appear. 
Thereafter the first witness called was defendant under sec-
tion 2055 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and the written 
contracts were introduced without objection. On repeated 
occasions during the presentation of plaintiff's case his coun-
sel's statement that the action was for breach of contract 
was not challenged by defendant. 
[2] Defendant moved for a nonsuit on the grounds that 
the action was barred by section 339(1) of the Code of Civil 
Procedure, asserting that the action was one for negligence 
and that there was no evidence of negligence because there 
was no expert testimony as in a malpractice case. Plaintiff 
opposed the motion on the ground that the action was based 
updn breach of a written contract. Defendant then asked 
leave to amend his answer to plead section 337 ( 1) of the 
Code of Civil Procedure (four-year limitation on actions 
to recover on a written contract) as a defense. The court 
denied the request on the ground that it was not timely. 
It had grounds for exercise of its discretion in making the 
ruling because, as seen, the complaint did indicate an action 
on contract and in plaintiff's opening statement, four days 
before, it stated the action was one on contract. 
[lb] Defendant urges that the complaint has the typical 
aspects of an action for malpractice (see Dunn v. Dufficy, 194 
Cal. 383 [228 P. 1029] ; Lattin v. Gillette, 95 Cal. 317 [30 
P. 545, 29 .Am.St.Rep. 115] ; Hall v. Steele, 193 Cal. 602 [226 
P. 854] ; Mirich v. Balsinger, 53 Cal..App.2d 103 [127 P.2d 
639] ) , but as we have seen it also has all the elements of 
a contract. He also states that in· cases against physicians 
it has been stated that the allegation of the employment is 
a mere matter of inducement and the action is in tort (Hall 
v. Steele, supra, 193 Cal. 602; Huysman v. Kirsch, 6 Cal.2d 
302 [57 P.2d 908] ; Hat·ding v. Liberty Hospital Corp., 177 
Cal. 520 [171 P. 98); Kershaw v. Tilbury, 214 Cal. 679 [8 
P.2d 109]; Estate of Pillsbury; 175 Cal. 454 [166 P. 11, 3 
A.L.R. 1396).),. and that a passenger's injury while riding 
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on a streetcar is in tort rather than the contract of carriage. 
(Basler v. Sacramento Etc. Ry. Oo., 166 Cal. 33 [134 P. 
993].) The various holdings on whether an action is tort 
or contract are summarized: ''Although the distinctions in 
forms of actions have been abolished, the obligation upon 
which a cause of action is founded may be either contractual 
or delictual in nature. This distinction is still of fundamental 
importance with respect to such matters as jurisdiction, venue, 
the availability of attachment or garnishment, and the limi-
tation of actions. And an action commenced in contract can-
not be amended so as to change the proceeqing into an ac-
tion in tort, nor may an action commenced in tort be changed 
to one in contract. 
"For the designation of actions as contractual or delictual, 
it is to be noted that a contract is defined as an agreement 
to do or not to do a certain thing, and a tort as any wrong, 
not consisting in mere breach of contract, for which the law 
undertakes to give the injured party some appropriate remedy 
against the wrongdoer. If a cause of action arises from a 
breach of a promise, the action is contractual in nature ; if 
it arises from the breach of a duty growing out of the con-
tract, it is delictual, and a tort or trespass is none the less 
~:~uch because it also involves a breach of contract. There is 
obviously some overlapping here, and where it is not clear 
to which class an action belongs, it will ordinarily be con-
strued as in contract rather than in tort. . . . 
"Notwithstanding the basic distinctions between actions 
on contract and in tort, there are many wrongful acts that 
constitute a breach of duty that is not only created by con-
tract but imposed by law as well. Thus, negligence may be 
conceived as being of two types: delictual negligence, which 
involves a breach of a duty owed to a world at large, as to 
the general public in driving an automobile; and contractual 
negligence, which consists of a breach of a primary duty 
owed to the injured party-a 'polarized' duty arising from 
some prior relationship between him and the tortfeasor, as 
in the case of a bailee or common carrier. The latter type 
of negligence ordinarily gives rise to an action either on con-
tract or in tort, and the injured party may at his election 
waive the contract and sue in tort, or waive the tort and 
base his action on the contract alone. Thus an injury to a 
passenger on a common carrier, by wrongful ejectment or 
failure to carry him to his destination, constitutes a breach 
of the carr ier's contract of safe carriage to a specific place, 
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and also a breach of its legal duty arising from its position 
in performing a public 'service. Similarly, an action by a 
depositor against a bank for failure to honor a check arises 
out of contract in the sense that the injury was sustained 
as a result of the contractual relation, but also contains an 
element of tort, in that it is based on violation of the duty 
to exercise due care. In general, however, actions based on 
negligent failure to perform contractual duties, such as those 
owing from a hospital or physician to a patient, from an 
employer to an employee, and from a landlord to a tenant, 
although containing elements of both contract and tort, are 
regarded as delictual actions, since negligence is considered 
the gravamen of the action." (1 Cal.Jur.2d, Actions, §§ 29, 
30.) In regard to an accountant it has been held that an 
action against him for failure to perform his obligation to 
the person employing him may be in contract. (See Smith 
v. London Assurance Corp., 109 App.Div. 882 [96 N.Y.S. 
820] ; City of East Grand Forks v. Steele, 121 Minn. 296 
[141 N.W 181, Ann.Cas. 1914C 720, 45 L.R.A.N.S. 205] ; 
National Surety Corp. v. Lybrand, 256 App.Div. 226 [9 
N.Y.S.2d 554] ; Board of County Oommrs. of Allen County 
v. Baker, 152 Kan. 164 [102 P.2d 1006] .) 
[3] In the instant case the complaint shows and the court 
found that defendant contracted to do a specific thing, namely, 
to prepare and file plaintiff's income tax returns in the time 
required by law. There is no equivocation or shading of 
the obligation. It was not limited to the exercise of ordinary 
care. It was a positive, specific duty which he assumed. Any 
justUication or excuse for failure to perform it could be a 
matter of defense. It differs in that respect from an action 
against a physician who does not agree to achieve any par-
ticular result; he merely agrees to act in a nonnegligent 
manner. Even in the physician cases it would not be doubted 
that if a doctor is specifically employed to remove a wart 
from the patient's foot but removes one from his face, there 
would be a breach of contract. Likewise, it is dissimilar from 
an accountant who is employed generally to audit the em-
ployer's books where he assumes the general obligation to 
exercise due care. 
[4] It follows that as section 337 (1), Code of Civil Pro-
cedure (four-year limitation period for actions on written 
contracts) was not timely raised and the action being based 
on a written contract rather than on negligence, there is no 
bar of the action by reason of the statute o~ limitations. In 
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addition, however, the court found that defendant . wilfully 
and fraudulently concealed from plaintiff that the so-called 
''completed'' returns were nullities and did not comply with 
the law, that the federal officers sought to enforce late :filing 
penalties, and that plaintiff did not discover those matters 
until March 15, 1948. Defendant claims that finding is not 
supported by the evidence. 
[5] The action was commenced on December 7, 1948. Four 
years prior thereto was December 6, 1944. The breach of 
the first contract for filing of the return for the year 1943 
occurred on March 15, 1944, when the return was not filed 
or in June or July, 1944, to which the time bad been extended 
at defendant's request. We therefore look to the evidence 
between at most March 15, 1944 and December 6, 1944, to 
ascertain whether during that period there was a conceal-
ment which would toll the· four-year statute. Mr. Olson, 
plaintiff's president, testified that he was solely dependent 
on defendant and placed complete trust and confidence in 
him for accounting practice in his business and in prepara-
tion of tax returns. Defendant visited him shortly after 
February 7, 1944, the date of the first letter contract, and 
Olson signed the contract. There was no conversation. De-
fendant did not say it would take not less than six weeks 
to prepare the returns. Defendant came out sometime before 
March 15, 1944, and had him sign an application for an 
extension of time to file returns when defendant said he could 
not make out the report in time and hence had to ask for an 
extension, to which Olson replied that "It's unfortunate." 
But, defendant said : "It was nothing to worry about, just 
a matter of form. Q. Did you believe him Y A. I did." 
Later, defendant presented another application for exten-
sion. About May 12, 1944, he (Olson) "again" asked de-
fendant about the return and the latter said "I mustn't 
worry about that because he is capable of taking care of 
those things; and I believed him. Q. You believed him. Now, 
at the time when the income tax return was due, on March . 
15, 1944, did you have money in the bank with which to 
pay your tax? A. I did.'' In connection with the so-called 
"completed returns" (they were a nullity) which defendant 
had Olson sign shortly before the last extension expired, de-
fendant said ''that he would take care of the whole thing 
and I shouldn't worry about it. Q. Did you rely upon and 
believe what he said to you Y A. I did." From then on 
Olson thought the "completed returns" were sufficient by 
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reason of what defendant told him. Henricksen, plaintiff's 
bookkeeper, testified that defendant told him i;t February, 
1944, that the time was too short to prepare the returns by 
March 15, 1944, but as will be recalled defendant obtained 
extensions of time to July, 1944, and, as above seen, he as-
sured Olson that everything was all right. Defendant's testi-
mony is to the contrary, but nothing more than a conflict 
was created. It is clear that the evidence is sufficient to sup-
port the court's finding that the statute of limitation was 
tolled. 
In view of the result reached herein other contentions of 
defendant, such as the lack of evidence of negligence to sup-
port a t<l'rt action, the applicability of Code of Civil Pro-
cedure section 339 ( 1), that he was deprived of his right to-
raise contract action defenses, became unimportant. 
Amicus curiae contend that assuming the action is one in 
tort, Code of Civil Procedure section 339 (1) does not apply; 
that section 343, the residuary limitation period of four years 
applies; that the malpractice cases applying section 339(1) 
were incorrectly decided. From the foregoing discussion 
those questions need not be discussed. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., 
Schauer, J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied June 19, 
1952. 
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